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Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment  
in a Cap-and-Trade System 
Harrison Fell and Richard D. Morgenstern 
Abstract 
We compare several emissions reduction instruments, including quantity policies with banking 
and borrowing, price policies, and hybrid policies (safety valve and price collar), using a dynamic model 
with stochastic baseline emissions. The instruments are compared under the design goal of obtaining the 
same expected cumulative emissions across all options. Based on simulation analysis with the model 
parameterized to values relevant to proposed U.S. climate mitigation policies, we find that restrictions on 
banking and borrowing, including the provision of interest rates on the borrowings, can severely limit the 
value of the policy, depending on the regulator-chosen allowance issuance path. Although emissions taxes 
generally provide the lowest expected abatement costs, a cap-and-trade system combined with either a 
safety valve or a price collar can be designed to provide expected abatement costs near those of a tax, but 
with lower emissions variance than a tax. Consistently, a price collar is more cost-effective than a safety 
valve for a given expected cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement 
when abatement costs decline.   
Key Words:  cost containment, safety valve, price collar, climate change 
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Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment  
in a Cap-and-Trade System  
Harrison Fell and Richard D. Morgenstern∗ 
I. Introduction 
Concern about the volatility of allowance prices has long been an element of the U.S. 
debate about a cap-and-trade scheme for carbon dioxide (CO2). Even with allowance banking, it 
is argued, large price swings could result from unanticipated changes in economic activity, 
weather, fuel prices, or technology development. Price spikes could force expensive mitigation, 
especially in the short run, whereas sharp price declines might discourage low-cost abatement as 
well as investment in new technologies. In fact, experience with previous environmental markets 
indicates considerable price volatility. For climate change, the issue may be especially salient, as 
efforts to control emissions may prove to be costly, eventually amounting to several percent of 
gross domestic product.  
Analysis linking uncertainty to instrument choice has its roots in the work of Weitzman 
(1974). This framework has been extended by Pizer (1999), Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002), and 
Newell and Pizer (2003) to consider stock externalities (pollutants) accumulating over time. 
They find that price policies tend to produce larger net benefits than quantity-based regulations. 
Yet, with respect to climate change mitigation, political economy issues have driven the focus on 
quantity controls, especially cap and trade, albeit with the inclusion of provisions to limit price 
volatility. In a recent study, Fell, et al. (2008) examined such provisions in the context of a 
stochastic dynamic framework, focusing on cost savings derived from allowance banking. Fell, 
et al. found that banking can considerably reduce the costs of a quantity-based regulation, with 
savings depending on the correlation of abatement cost shocks and growth of abatement 
requirements and other features. However, in all instances examined, Fell, et al. still found that 
price policies provide the lowest expected abatement cost by a substantial margin.    
It is also possible to combine quantity and price instruments—so-called hybrid policies—
as originally discussed in Roberts and Spence (1976) and Weitzman (1978). In terms of climate 
change policy, papers by Kopp, et al. (1997), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997), Pizer (2002), and 
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Newell, et al. (2005) examine how cap-and-trade mechanisms can be reconciled to more efficient 
price policies via the introduction of a safety valve or trigger price that effectively caps 
allowance (permit) prices by providing an unlimited supply of additional allowances at 
predetermined prices. Reflecting concerns about the environmental integrity of this approach, 
Murray, et al. (2008) introduced the notion of a quantitative restriction on the number of 
allowances that could be issued. Specifically, they advance a form of long-term or reserve 
borrowing with specified limits and payback to include interest. Both the safety valve and 
reserve borrowing approaches, along with allowance banking and borrowing provisions, have 
been incorporated into various legislative proposals for a U.S. cap-and-trade system. 
Most recently, papers by Philibert (2008) and Burtraw, et al. (2009) have advanced the 
idea of a symmetric safety valve, also known as a price collar, which would limit price volatility 
on both the upside and the downside. The upside trigger would be identical to the original safety 
valve. In the context of a system that involved considerable auctioning of allowances, the 
downside would be governed by a reserve auction price. If low prices prevailed for several years, 
the reserve auction price mechanism might be supplemented by reduced allocations in later 
years. To ensure that the price collar did not also introduce further uncertainty about future 
prices, the rules of the road would be established in advance for relatively long time periods. 
Interestingly, based on a retrospective analysis of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Burtraw et al. calculate that a price collar reflecting legislative intent would have 
improved economic welfare considerably, on the order of $1.5 to $8.25 billion per year since 
1995 (in 2004 dollars). Similarly, using a four period model developed by the International 
Energy Agency to assess the goal of halving global energy-related CO2 emissions by 2050, 
Philibert (2008) finds a collar can meet the emissions reduction objective more cost effectively 
than emissions standards alone or emissions standards with a price cap. 
Despite the range of cost containment approaches advanced to reduce price volatility in a 
domestic CO2 cap-and-trade system, questions remain about their relative performance, both in 
terms of environmental performance (emissions reduced) and costs. In the present paper, we 
attempt to fill that void by developing an analytical framework for comparing the costs of 
alternative mechanisms, including hybrid versions of the alternatives, holding constant the 
expected environmental outcomes. Specifically, we present a stochastic dynamic representative 
firm model in which the firm chooses emissions paths under various regulatory regimes in an 
effort to minimize abatement costs, à la Fell et al. The policy is not updated after it is 
implemented. We break from Fell et al. in that we consider a finite time horizon model, which 
allows for greater flexibility in modeling the issuance path for emissions allowances. By Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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performing Monte Carlo simulations, we estimate the means and distributions of both the 
expected cumulative emissions and the costs. This paper differs from the price collar analyses of 
Burtraw, et al. (2009) and Philibert (2008) in two key ways. First, both Burtraw, et al. (2009) and 
Philibert (2008) use a deterministic model where parameter values vary to approximate a world 
of uncertainty, whereas we explicitly model firms’ efforts to minimize abatement costs in the 
face of uncertain future emissions and abatement costs. Second, unlike the previous analyses, we 
couple the hybrid mechanisms with allowance banking and borrowing provisions. The inclusion 
of banking and borrowing provisions alters the firm’s dynamic cost minimization problem by 
linking abatement decisions across time. Specific policies considered include: cap-and-trade 
without banking/borrowing, cap-and-trade with unlimited banking/borrowing, cap-and-trade 
with restricted banking/borrowing, cap-and-trade with price collars and restricted 
banking/borrowing, cap-and-trade with a safety valve and restricted banking/borrowing, and a 
tax policy. For comparison purposes, the analysis is keyed to the basic parameters contained in S. 
1766, the Bingaman-Specter legislation (U.S. Congress 2007c). It includes CO2 and other 
covered gases/sources. 
Overall, we find that the restrictions imposed on banking and borrowing in current 
proposals can be costly. Adding a safety valve or price collar to the reserve borrowing proposal 
can further reduce costs. In fact, based on our modeling, we find that a price collar can achieve 
costs almost as low as a tax, albeit with less emissions variation than a tax. We also find that 
price collar mechanisms outperform their safety valve counterparts in terms of expected 
abatement costs at the same level of expected cumulative emissions, while retaining similar 
upper emissions bounds. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section II, we outline the basic model. In 
section III, we review the solution algorithm used and describe the parameterization of the 
model. Section IV discusses the implication of allowance borrowing restrictions. Section V 
presents the policy comparisons under different assumed allowance issuance paths and price 
mechanism derivations. Concluding remarks are made in section VI. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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II. The Model 
The model presented here is a representative firm model. We do not consider internal 
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where  t q represents the expected baseline emissions (average cost-minimizing emissions) at time 
t, θt is the shock to baseline emissions and qt is the firm’s emissions choice at time t. Given the 
quadratic form, ct represents the slope of the marginal cost function (ct > 0). We allow the shocks 
to be correlated across time by representing θt as a deterministic function of an order one 
autoregressive process:
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Because the focus of this paper is CO2 regulation, we assume that emissions accumulate 
in the atmosphere as a nearly pure stock pollutant. By considering a stock pollutant for which a 
significant damage threshold is not near, the regulator focuses on cumulative emissions over the 
regulatory period rather than the emissions time path. We also avoid formalizing a specific 
benefits function for the reduction of the stock pollutant and instead operate under the 
assumption that the regulator implements policy to obtain a predetermined cumulative emissions 
target. 
In the case of a cap-and-trade program without banking and borrowing, the firm’s choice 
of emissions in each period is simply equal to the period-specific issuance of allowances, yt. 
However, when banking and borrowing are introduced, solving for the firm’s emissions path 
problem becomes more difficult because it is possible that qt ≠ yt as the firm chooses 
bank/borrow levels to reallocate allowances across time. The firm’s optimization problem with 
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Equation (2) represents the firm’s objective to minimize the net present value (NPV) of 
abatement costs (equivalent to maximizing negative NPV of abatement costs), where β is the 
firm’s discount factor. The first constraint given in (3) defines the banking dynamics. This 
constraint simply states that next period’s bank level (Bt+1) is equal to this period’s bank level 
(Bt) plus the difference between the allowances issued this period (yt) and this period’s actual 
emissions (qt), multiplied by a regulator-imposed interest rate (Rt).2 Note that Rt, also referred to 
as the intertemporal trading ratio, has a time subscript. The time subscript is imposed because, as 
in proposed legislation, the interest rate may vary depending on whether the firm banks or 
borrows (e.g., U.S. Congress 2007b). More specifically we consider Rt of the form  
  ( ) if 0 
otherwise
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 (4) 
Also consistent with proposed legislation, the second constraint in (3) allows for the 
regulator to set period limitations on banking and/or borrowing. The final constraint of (3) puts a 
terminal condition on the problem, which states that the firm may not have any outstanding 
borrowed allowances at the completion of the regulatory period. 
Given the above problem specification, the corresponding Bellman equation can be 
written as 
  () () ( )
2
11 1 ,m a x , | ,
2 t
t
tt t t t t tt t t t t q
c
VB q q EV B B θθ β θ θ ++ +
⎧⎫ =−+ − + ⎡ ⎤ ⎨⎬ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭
 (5) 
subject to (3). We have defined Vt(Bt,θt) recursively as the expected NPV of abatement costs in 
period t, conditional on the current bank level Bt and baseline emissions shock θt and assuming 
optimal behavior in every future period. Therefore, by solving for V0(B0, θ0), we can solve for the 
expected discounted abatement cost of a regulatory policy given an initial bank level/shock 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of this paper, the term bank levels and variable Bt can encompass both banking states (Bt  ≥ 0) and 
borrowing states (Bt < 0).  Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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condition. Unfortunately, solving for V0(B0, θ0) is not a straightforward task, as described in 
more detail in the next section. 
The price collar case we consider is a fairly straightforward extension of the problem 
above. Specifically, the price collar simply acts as price floor and price ceiling for emissions 
allowance prices, where the price of emissions at time t, Pt, is given as the marginal cost of 
abatement, () () tt t t t t t PM C q c q q θ == + − . When the price ceiling is in effect, we assume that the 
regulator offers a sale of an unlimited number of allowances at the ceiling price 
c
t P . When the 
price floor is triggered, we assume that the regulator buys allowances at the price floor value 
f
t P .3 Thus, the firm’s problem now has the additional constraint 
f c
tt t PP P < < . 
When the price of allowances lies between the ceiling and floor prices, the optimization 
problem is the same as that described above. When the price ceiling is triggered, the firm 
essentially acts as if an emissions tax is imposed and emits up to the point where  ()
c
tt MCq P = , 
purchasing additional allowances beyond the issued yt level to cover its emissions qt. However, 
in the case where banking is allowed, the firm may purchase more allowances than needed to 
cover the difference between qt and yt in an effort to increase its bank level. Denoting 
p
t q as the 
quantity of allowances purchased when a price ceiling is triggered, the optimization problem 
during a period when the price ceiling is in effect can be written as 
  () () ( )
2
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tt t t t t t t tt t t t t q
c
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 (6) 
subject to an altered bank dynamics equation,  ( ) 1
p
tt t t t t B RB y q q + =+ + − . Differentiating (6) 
with respect to 
p


















= ⎢ ⎥ ∂ ⎣ ⎦
 (7) 
That is, the firm will purchase allowances up to the point where the expected discounted 
marginal value of a unit of banked allowances is equal to the price ceiling.  
With a price floor in effect, again the firm will act as though a tax is imposed and emit to 
the point where ( )
f
tt MCq P = . The firm then must decide how many of the excess allowances it 
                                                 
3 Baumol and Oates (1988) argue that subsidizing emissions reductions in a competitive industry can lead to 
decreased output at the firm level, but increased output at the industry level and can also lead to higher emissions. 
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will sell back to the regulator and how many it will contribute to the bank, assuming banking is 
allowed. Denoting 
s
t q as the allowances the firm sells back to the regulator, the firm’s 
optimization problem in a period with the price floor triggered can be written as 
  () () ( )
2
11 1 ,m a x , | ,
2 t
fs t
tt t t t t t t tt t t t t q
c
VB q q P q EV B B θ θβ θ θ ++ +
⎧⎫ =−+ − + + ⎡ ⎤ ⎨⎬ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭
 (8) 
subject to the altered bank dynamics equation  ( ) 1
s
tt t t t t B RB y q q + =+ − −  and the limit on 
allowance sales 0 ( )
s
tt t qy q <≤ −. Assuming the 
s
t q limit is not binding, differentiating (8) with 
respect to
s
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Similar to (7), (9) states that the firm will sell allowances back to the regulator until the 
point at which the discounted expected marginal value of banking an allowance equals the price 
floor. Assuming that sales back to the regulator can happen, the floor acts as a mechanism to 
remove allowances from the system and, therefore, counteracts the allowance, creating the 
properties of the price ceiling. 
For the purpose of this paper, a safety valve is equivalent to a collar without a price floor. 
Thus, if the price ceiling is set at a level where it may be binding, cumulative emissions will 
exceed those of a cap-and-trade system if the allowance issuance path is the same for both 
systems. To reach the same expected cumulative emissions target under a safety valve as that of 
a cap-and-trade system, the regulator must issue fewer allowances.  
For a tax policy, we assume that the regulator sets the tax to achieve an ex-ante expected 
emissions path yt. Knowing that the firm will equate MC(qt) to the tax level, the regulator sets the 
tax in each period equal to  
  ( ) ( ) tt t t t t t t tax E c q y c q y θ =+ − = − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (10) 
By setting MC(qt) = taxt, we get the firm’s emissions level at each time period 
tt t qy θ =+. Substituting this result back into (2), we calculate the firm’s NPV of abatement cost 










− ∑  (11) 
From (11) we see that, regardless of the realized shocks to baseline emissions, the tax policy 
leads to the same NPV of abatement costs for a given regulator-proposed emissions path target, 
yt. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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The above discussion outlines the general model properties of the policies we examine in 
this paper. The goal is to compare these policies on the basis of expected NPV of abatement 
costs, holding constant the expected cumulative emissions. This requires solving for V0(B0, θ0) 
for each policy. Unfortunately, given the uncertainty in the model, closed-form solutions to the 
recursive Bellman equations do not exist. We proceed by solving these problems through 
numerical methods as described in the next section.  
III. Numerical Analysis 
To solve a numerical approximation to the problems described above, we first discretize 
θt and Bt. We consider 201 possible θt values and 201 possible Bt values at each time period. To 
discretize θt, we first discretize  t θ %  by creating 201 evenly spaced values of  t θ % on the interval 
from –5 to 5 standard deviations (based on σ
2) away from the zero mean, and then multiply each 
discrete value by (1 + gθ)
t–1 to get the θt. Given the distribution of εt and the AR(1) process of  t θ % , 
a transition probability matrix for θt to θt+1 can also be constructed. Bt is discretized by creating 
201 evenly spaced values of Bt on the interval from Bmin,t to Bmax,t. In addition, by discretizing Bt 
for all t and by forming a predefined yt path, qt is, in effect, discretized for each time period given 
the bank dynamic equation in (3). 
Because the cost minimization problem is set up as a finite time horizon problem, we use 
a backward recursion solution algorithm to solve the value function Vt(Bt, θt) in each time period. 
This solution algorithm begins by solving VT(BT, θT). Under the assumption that the terminal 
period constraint is binding (BT+1 = 0), it is straightforward to solve qT and the resulting 
abatement costs for each (BT, θT) state, VT(BT, θT), given that BT+1 = 0. With VT(BT, θT) and the 
transition probability matrix for θT–1 to θT, one can solve for the expected value function, 
() 1 ,|, TT TT T EV B B θθ − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . Given ( ) 11 ,| , TT TT T EV B B θθ −− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , a  1 T q
∗
− , and the resulting VT–1, can be 
solved for as the value of qT–1 that maximizes (5). For the cases of price collars and safety valves, 
if a resulting optimal  1 T q
∗
−  triggers a price ceiling (floor), then  1 ˆT q −  will be such that 
() 11 11 ˆˆ () ()
cf
TT T TT T M C qP M C qP −− −− == , and  ( ) 11
pb
TT qq −− will be chosen to maximize (7) ((8)). The 
variable  1 T q
∗









−−− =+ when a price floor is in effect. This recursive procedure of solving Vt–1 given Vt, 
including adjustments for possible price floors and ceilings, is repeated until t = 0. The end 
results of this recursion are T + 1 Vt(Bt, θt) value matrices that define the expected NPV of 
abatement cost at each possible (Bt, θt) combination for each time period 0 to T, as well as T + 1 Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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(,) tt t qB θ
∗  matrices that define the optimal emissions level for each possible (Bt, θt) combination 
at each time period. 
With the given condition (B0, θ0), V0(B0, θ0) gives the expected NPV of abatement cost 
for the policy in question. However, with safety valve and price collar policies considered, 
finding expected cumulative emissions is not as straightforward. We therefore use the optimal 
emissions choice matrices  (,) tt t qB θ
∗  and the banking dynamic equations in Monte Carlo 
simulations where we first generate θt series then derive firm-optimal emissions and bank level 
paths. Our simulation results are based on 2,500 simulated paths for each policy considered.4    
Values used in our numerical analyses are based on those relevant to the U.S. climate 
policy debate, with emissions targets loosely parameterized to S.1766 - Low Carbon Economy 
Act of 2007 (U.S. Congress 2007c). We consider a time horizon of 39 periods (t = 0 to t = 38), 
corresponding to a policy running from 2012 to 2050. To calculate baseline emissions, we first 
sum expected emissions from greenhouse gases (GHGs) covered under S.1766—CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuels based on EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 20095 (EIA 2008a), and nitrous oxide 
emissions from adipic and nitric acid production (EIA 2008a). Projections of these emissions are 
given from 2012 to 2030. For simplicity, we assume that baseline emissions grow at a constant 





− =+ ). We use the calculated 2012 baseline emissions 
level as  0 q  and calculate  q g using the calculated 2030 baseline emissions value.6   
S.1766 calls for emissions to be reduced to 2006 baseline emissions levels by 2020, to 
1990 baseline emissions levels by 2030, and at least 60 percent below 2006 baseline emissions 
levels by 2050. The bill also outlines an annual emissions allowance issuance path for 2012 to 
2030. However, in light of the recent economic downturn, the allowance issuance path as written 
would likely require little or no early-period emissions cuts. Thus, we alter this emissions path 
by assuming that the allowance issuance declines at a constant rate from 2012 to 2050 (i.e., yt = 
y0(1 + gy)). To solve for gy we assume that y0 is equal to expected 2010 baseline emissions (6.032 
                                                 
4 Reported emissions values resulting from simulation exercises take into account that, for periods with a price 
ceiling or price floor in effect, the actual emissions level is  ˆ not  tt qq
∗. 
5 See: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/aeoref_tab.html, flourinated gases emissions.  
6 The resulting baseline emissions path obtained from this process closely follows, but is slightly below, the 
expected baseline emissions path for covered emissions according to EIA’s analysis of S. 2191 (EIA 2008b). This 
baseline path is, however, far below the path estimated in EIA (2008a)—a path that does not account for the recent 
economic downturn. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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Gt CO2) and that the 2030 goal of 1990 baseline emissions levels (4.819 Gt CO2) is met. We also 
explore other allowance issuance paths that lead to the same number of cumulative emissions 
allowances issued over the 39 periods. 
We assume that c0 = $30/tCO2, based on estimates used in EPA (2008). The variable ct is 
assumed to decline at a constant rate over the time horizon, with gc = 0.025. The discount rate 
used is β = 0.95. Based on Newell and Pizer (2003), we set the correlation factor ρ for the 
baseline emission shocks at 0.8. We set the standard deviation of εt, σ, at 1/3 Gt CO2, roughly 
five percent of the expected initial baseline emissions. We assume that the shocks grow at the 
same rate as baseline emissions ( q gg θ = ), ensuring that the shocks retain their relative 
importance as baseline emissions increase. For the restricted borrowing cases, we assume that 
Rneg = 1.08 and Bmin,t = –0.15yt, both values near levels given in S.2191. For all cases with 
banking, Rpos = 1.0 and Bmax,t is set sufficiently large to ensure that the bank level upper bound is 
never binding given the other base case parameters (i.e., unlimited banking). These parameter 
values, along with relevant sources, are summarized in Table 1.  
     Table 1. Baseline Parameter Values
 
Description Parameter  Value  Source 
Initial baseline 
emissions  0 q   6.158 (Gtons) 
2012 value from EIA analysis of 
S.1766 (using AEO 2009) 
Initial allocation  y
0  6.032 (Gtons) 
Based on 2010 baseline from EIA 
(using AEO 2009) 
Initial slope of MC(qt)  c
0  $30/ton  EPA (2008)—Analysis of S.2191 
Growth of baseline 
emissions  q g  0.0066 
EIA—Analysis of S.1766 (using AEO 
2009, assuming constant growth) 
Decline in slope of MC  g
c  –0.025   
Growth in shock  g
θ  0.0066  
Decline in yt  gy  –0.0124  Approximate decline of S.1766 
Stnd. error of shock  σ  0.33 (Gtons)   
Corr. of shocks  ρ  0.8  Newell and Pizer (2003) 
Interest for borrowing  Rneg  1.08  Slightly below S.2191 rate of 10% 
Interest for banking  Rpos  1.0  Value in S.2191, S.1766 
Borrowing limit  B
min,t  –0.15y
t  Based on S.2191 borrowing limit 
Discount factor  β  0.95   
Terminal period  T  38  Corresponding to 2012 to 2050 
 Notes: Rneg and Bmin, t are used whenever restricted banking/borrowing is referenced. In policy analysis with banking 
allowed, Bmax,t is set such that it is never binding for the parameter values used. gy is used only for policies with 
constant-declining emissions paths. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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  IV. Results with Restrictions on Borrowing 
Allowing banking and borrowing gives firms the opportunity to temporally shift 
abatement requirements. The ability to bank and borrow allowances is useful for the firm for two 
different, though not necessarily unrelated, reasons. The first reason a firm may bank/borrow, 
which can happen with or without abatement cost uncertainties, arises when the long-term 
issuance path designed by the regulator differs from the optimal (cost-minimizing) emissions 
path of the firm. For instance, if the regulator has imperfect information about the firms’ 
abatement costs or discount rates, the regulator’s allowance issuance path will likely deviate 
from the firm-optimal emissions path. In this case, firms would use banking/borrowing to 
intertemporally reallocate allowances to match the firm-optimal emissions path. Second, a firm 
may bank/borrow allowances to smooth out unexpected shocks to abatement costs. Despite the 
benefits from this additional flexibility, in practice many emissions allowance systems limit, if 
not prohibit, banking/borrowing.7  
When the damages from emissions are time path-dependent, the regulator will have an 
incentive to limit banking/borrowing. The design of optimal intertemporal trading schemes with 
path-dependent pollutants has been explored by, among others, Rubin (1996), Cronshaw and 
Kruse (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), and Yates and Cronshaw (2001). However, most GHGs 
are stock pollutants, meaning that the damage is a function of the accumulated stock of the 
pollutant. Given the slow decay rate of many GHGs, particularly CO2, and assuming that current 
levels of GHG stocks in the atmosphere are not near a severe damage threshold, the GHG 
regulator is less concerned with the path of emissions and more focused on the expected 
accumulation of emissions over the regulatory period. That is, path-dependent damages should 
not be a primary justification for banking/borrowing restrictions in the context of GHGs.8  
In the case of climate change, political economic concerns seem to be the principal 
motivation for restricting banking/borrowing and, more specifically, for restricting borrowing. If 
the regulator fears that excessive borrowing in the early years of the trading program may lead to 
unacceptably high allowance prices in the future, then the regulator may move to limit borrowing 
                                                 
7 For instance, in Southern California’s RECLAIM trading program, banking and borrowing are effectively 
prohibited, the E.U.-Emission Trading System and U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program allow banking but prohibit 
borrowing, and the proposed climate bill S.2191 allows banking and restricted forms of borrowing. 
8 Leiby and Rubin (2001) do consider intertemporal trading ratio restrictions for GHGs, invoking a path dependency 
based on stock damages, and therefore find some justification for not allowing a one-to-one trading of allowances 
across time. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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in all periods. In proposed U.S. climate change legislation, bills permitting allowance borrowing 
limit the borrowing quantity in any given period and charge interest on the borrowed allowances 
(see U.S. Congress 2007a, 2007b, 2008). However, these restrictions on borrowing reduce firms’ 
emissions flexibility and, thus, raise expected program costs. In this section, we attempt to 
quantify these costs. 
 




































































Notes: Rneg refers to interest charged on borrowed allowances, γ refers to the fraction of yt that can be borrowed  
(Bmin,t = γyt). 
By solving the dynamic optimization problem given above under the relevant base case 
parameters, we are able to calculate the expected NPV of abatement costs for different 
borrowing restriction policies. We focus on the two often-used policy levers for limiting 
borrowing, quantitative caps and interest to be paid on borrowed allowances. Figure 1 gives a 
surface plot of the expected NPV of abatement costs given these borrowing limitation policy 
levers with no price caps or collars and for an allowance issuance path following a constant 
decline rate. The y-axis of Figure 1 presents the borrowing cap as Bmin,t = γyt. For instance, γ = 0 Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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means that borrowing is prohibited, whereas γ = 5 allows the firm to carry a negative bank level 
in any period equal to five times the amount of that period’s issued allowances.9 The x-axis of 
Figure 1 represents the interest charged on borrowed allowances. In this case, Rneg = 1 means that 
no interest is charged on borrowed allowances, whereas Rneg = 1.10 means that if an allowance is 
borrowed at t, then the firm owes 1.10 allowances in t + 1, i.e., a 10 percent interest rate. The z-
axis of Figure 1 represents the expected NPV of abatement costs at t = 0 with B0 = 0 and θ0 = 0 
(i.e., V0(0, 0)).  
The figure clearly shows that imposing borrowing provisions increases the cost of the 
cap-and-trade program. Prohibiting borrowing, given the constant-decline allowance path, 
increases expected abatement costs by about 14 percent compared to the unlimited 
banking/borrowing case. Furthermore, the figure shows that, for borrowing interest rates greater 
than approximately six percent, the inclusion of borrowing provides little cost saving versus a 
complete prohibition on borrowing, regardless of the borrowing level limits. Therefore, 
borrowing provisions in proposed legislation such as S.2191, which sets Rneg = 1.10 and γ = 0.15, 
provide essentially no expected abatement cost reductions over policies without borrowing.  
For the values displayed in Figure 1, banking and borrowing allowances are valuable for 
dealing with transient, but persistent abatement cost shocks, as well as for reallocating 
allowances to a firm-optimal emissions path. If the regulator can issue allowances over time in a 
manner more consistent with the firm’s optimal emissions path, given a set cumulative emissions 
goal, then the intertemporal reallocation of allowances will be used primarily for dealing with the 
transient cost shocks. Thus, we consider the effects of borrowing restrictions, assuming that the 
regulator issues allowances according to the ex-ante expected optimal emissions path of the firm 
for the given cumulative emissions target.10 A comparison of the ex-ante optimal issuance path 
and the constant-decline issuance path is given in Figure 2. As shown in this figure, the ex-ante 
firm-optimal path calls for relatively minor abatement in early periods and significant abatement 
in later periods. Likewise, for the case with no uncertainty and allowances issued on the 
constant-decline path, we see that the representative firm would initially bank allowances (firm-
optimal path lies below the constant-decline path), then draw down the bank and borrow 
                                                 
9 For the parameter values used here when γ ≈ 5, Bmin,t is never binding.  
10 To solve for this path, we simply solve the dynamic optimization problem (6) with baseline emissions shocks 
removed and no restrictions on banking and borrowing. The formulation of this path is similar to the “second-best” 
path discussed in Leiby and Rubin (2001). Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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allowances in the middle periods of the regulatory term (firm-optimal path is above the constant-
decline path), and finally repays the borrowed allowances in the final periods. Though not 
plotted, it should also be noted that without uncertainty in baseline emissions, the ex-ante firm-
optimal allocation path leads allowance prices to follow the well-known Hotelling rule—
allowance prices rise at the rate of interest. 
Figure 2: Permit Issuing Paths 




































Figure 3 displays the surface plot assuming an ex-ante firm-optimal issuance path. Again, 
it is evident that borrowing restrictions increase the expected cost of the cap-and-trade program. 
However, the additional costs associated with these restrictions are far less than those of the 
constant-decline allowance issuance path case. This is as expected because banking/borrowing is 
now used primarily to deal with transient, but persistent, cost shocks rather than to make a major 
modification to the issuance path. With the ex-ante firm-optimal issuance path, prohibiting 
borrowing increases the expected abatement cost by only four percent compared to the unlimited 
banking/borrowing case. Again, borrowing interest rates greater than approximately six percent 
effectively eliminates any expected benefits from including a borrowing provision. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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Notes: Firm-optimal issuance path refers to the issuance of allowances ex-ante expected optimal emissions path of 
the firm. 
V. Policy Comparison 
In this section, we compare abatement costs across various emissions regulation policies, 
while holding expected cumulative emissions constant across all policies. The general categories 
of the policies we review are cap-and-trade policies, hybrid policies, and an emissions tax policy. 
For the cap-and-trade policies, we consider a cap-and-trade system without banking/borrowing; a 
system with unlimited banking/borrowing; and a system with unlimited banking, but restricted 
borrowing, where borrowing is restricted by both a borrowing cap and interest charged on 
borrowed allowances. For hybrid polices, we consider both price collar mechanisms and standard 
one-sided safety valve mechanisms. We also incorporate unlimited banking and restricted 
borrowing provisions with the hybrid mechanisms. For these mechanisms, we are focused on 
abatement costs only. Abatement costs for the hybrid mechanisms do not include the additional 
cost to firms incurred when they buy allowances at the price ceiling or cost reductions from Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
16 
selling allowances at the price floor, though these cost additions and reductions do appear in the 
firm’s optimization problem. The tax policy we use sets tax rates that are given in (10). 
Although the hybrid mechanisms we include here have been discussed in the literature, 
there is no generally-accepted implementation rule is generally accepted, particularly for the 
price collar policy. In this study, we consider a fixed spread (FS) collar, which maintains a 
constant spread between 
f
t P  and 
c
t P  for all t, so
cf
tt t spread P P X = −= . Although the spread 
remains constant over time, the values of 
f
t P  and 
c
t P  grow over time. Given this representation, 
the design questions are, what path should the price collars follow and what should the spread 
be? We reference the growth of 
f
t P  and 
c
t P  to the ex-ante expected allowance price path under a 
policy with no banking/borrowing,  [ ] ( ) 00 ()
y
tt t t t t EP EM C y c q y ⎡⎤ == − ⎣⎦ . In the limit, as X 
approaches zero the collar mechanism becomes a tax policy, and as X becomes very large the 
collar mechanism effectively becomes a cap-and-trade policy. We choose two intermediate 
values for the spread, X1 = $10 and X2 = $20, to differentiate the policy from tax and cap-and-
trade policies and also to retain politically realistic spread values. Further, the spread X need not 
be symmetrically distributed about  0[]
y
t EP . That is, if  0
cy
tt PE P a ⎡⎤ = + ⎣⎦  and  0
fy
tt PE Pb ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦  
with a + b = X, a and b will not necessarily be equal if the goal is to minimize expected NPV of 
abatement costs while maintaining a constant expected cumulative emissions target. The values 
of a and b will depend on the particular banking/borrowing provisions adopted. To solve for a 
and b given X, we used the numerical analysis described above to conduct a grid search over 
possible values of a and b. The values of a and b used were those that minimized expected 
abatement costs (V0(0, 0)), while keeping expected cumulative emissions at or below the 
expected cumulative emissions goal (i.e., the cumulative emissions of the cap-and-trade 
program). Expected cumulative emissions were taken as the mean of the cumulative emissions 
from the 2,500 simulations.  
To enable a comparison of the safety valve with the price collar mechanism, we consider 
the safety valve as the one-sided analogue to the collar. That is, the price ceiling for the safety 
valve is the same price ceiling from the collar mechanism,  0
cy
tt PE P a ⎡⎤ = + ⎣⎦ . Because the safety 
valve mechanism has no process to remove the excess allowances bought when the ceiling price 
is triggered, the issuance path of allowances must be more restrictive than either the pure cap-
and-trade approach or the collar policy to maintain the expected cumulative emissions goal. The 
way in which the issuance path is made more restrictive will affect the NPV calculation of 
abatement costs. From an NPV of abatement cost minimization standpoint, it is more cost-Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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efficient to take emissions allowances from later periods rather than earlier periods. We therefore 






φ − +− =−  (12) 
In  (12), given a, φ is solved as the value that minimizes the expected NPV of abatement 
costs while keeping expected cumulative emissions at or below the cumulative emissions goal. 
Expected cumulative emissions were again taken as the mean of the cumulative emissions from 
the 2,500 simulations. 
 
Figure 4: Policy Comparison—Firm-Optimal Issuance Path
 
 
Notes: Coll. 1 refers to the collar with X = $10. Coll. 2 refers to the collar with X = $20. SV 1 and SV 2 refer to the 
policies using the same 
c
t P as the Coll. 1 and Coll. 2, respectively. Restr. B/B refers to policies with unlimited 
banking and restricted borrowing. No B/B refers to policies with no banking or borrowing. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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Figure 4 graphically represents a comparison of abatement costs and cumulative 
emissions for several of the relevant policy alternatives using the firm-optimal allowance 
issuance path described above (see Table 2 in the appendix for complete results). The expected 
NPV of abatement costs, referenced on the left-hand side vertical axis, are based on the t = 0 
(i.e., 2012) expectation with θ0 = 0 and B0 = 0. Cumulative emissions results, referenced on the 
right-hand side vertical axis, are based on the 2,500 simulations for each policy. Policies are 
listed from left to right in order of increasing expected NPV of abatement costs. 
As expected under the firm-optimal issuance path, a tax policy represents the lowest 
expected NPV of abatement across all policies considered for the given cumulative emissions 
goal. For the price collar mechanisms, we find that the tighter collar (Coll. 1, X = $10) leads to 
lower abatement costs than the looser collar (Coll. 2, X = $20). This is as expected since 
restricting the spread moves the collar mechanism closer to the tax policy. We also find that 
adding a banking and restricted borrowing provision to the collar mechanism can further reduce 
abatement costs compared to the collars without banking/borrowing. This is due to the added 
flexibility that banking and borrowing allows in dealing with baseline emission shocks. In 
comparing the collars with their one-sided counterparts, the safety valve policies, we find that the 
collars have lower expected abatement costs for the given expected cumulative emissions goal. 
This means that, in this setting, the discounted abatement cost increase of a more restrictive 
issuance path is greater than the cost increase due to a price floor. Finally, we find that the hybrid 
mechanisms generally lower expected NPV of abatement costs compared to the straight quantity 
mechanism (No BB) and compared to the quantity mechanism that allows banking and restricted 
borrowing (Restr. BB). The exceptions to this are the safety valve policies without 
banking/borrowing (SV1 No BB, SV2 No BB), both of which had slightly higher expected NPV 
of abatement costs than the quantity policy that allowed banking and restricted borrowing.  
Reviewing cumulative emissions results presented in Figure 4 show that the mean 
cumulative emissions values are held constant across the policies at 187.4. Though not visibly 
detectable, the one exception to this rule is for the quantity policy that allows banking and 
restricted borrowing. The mean cumulative emissions value for this policy lies slightly below the 
cumulative emissions target of 187.4 because, with Rneg > 1, any borrowing that occurs 
effectively takes allowances out of the systems, thereby reducing cumulative emissions. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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Looking at the spread of cumulative emissions outcomes, based on the 95 percent 
confidence intervals, we see that the tax policy leads to the greatest variability in cumulative 
emissions outcomes. The pure quantity policies, of course, have essentially no variability in 
cumulative emissions. The hybrid mechanisms reduce the cumulative emissions variability 
relative to the tax policy, with variability declining as the spread or price ceiling increases. This 
result is as expected because increasing X or 
f
c P  brings the hybrid mechanism closer to being a 
pure quantity policy. In addition, although the collar mechanisms have emissions outcomes that 
are nearly symmetric about the mean values, the safety valve mechanisms have much more 
skewed cumulative emissions outcomes. This is because the safety valve mechanisms have no 
design feature to remove allowances from the system aside from the relatively limited restricted 
borrowing provisions. This inability to remove allowances, while at the same time allowing for 
additional allowances to enter the system, skews the distribution toward larger cumulative 
emissions outcomes.  
Moving to the constant-declining allowance issuance path, recall that the price 
mechanisms, taxt,  , and  ,
cf
tt PP are based on an ex-ante expected price of allowances in a cap-
and-trade system with no banking and borrowing for the given allowance issuance path, 
0
y
t EP ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . Therefore, the constant-declining allowance issuance path will lead to price 
mechanisms that do not rise at the rate of interest. In fact,  0
y
t EP ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ rises at a rate greater than the 
rate of interest at the beginning of the regulatory term and then slows toward the end of this term. 
Because  0
y
t E P ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  grows faster than the rate of interest in the early period, arbitrage opportunities 
can exist under a collar mechanism with banking if the spread is sufficiently narrow. That is, 
firms can buy and bank extra allowances at the ceiling price, then turn around and sell these 
allowances back to the regulator at floor prices in later periods. This can lead to cumulative 
emissions greater than the sum of issued allowances (i.e., the cumulative emissions target is 
exceeded) if the realized baseline emission shocks are such that the arbitrage opportunity cannot 
be fully met. Similarly, because  0
y
t EP ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  starts out lower in the constant-declining issuance path 
than in the firm-optimal issuance path, if the price ceiling for a safety valve mechanism is set too 
low, excessive banking will occur in early periods leading to cumulative emissions outcomes 
greater than the target. This cannot always be corrected with a stricter issuance path because the 
stricter issuance path further increases the incentive to excessively bank in early periods.   
For our numerical analysis, with the constant-declining allowance issuance path it is not 
possible for expected cumulative emissions to meet the cumulative emissions target for the 
hybrid policy price collar mechanism where X = $10 and banking/restricted borrowing is Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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allowed. This policy and its safety valve analogue are therefore dropped in our policy 
comparison analysis for the constant-declining emissions path.  
Figure 5 gives a similar abatement cost and cumulative emissions comparison as in 
Figure 4, but the policies are based on the constant-declining allowance issuance path. Again, the 
policies are given from left to right in order of increasing expected NPV of abatement costs. The 
hybrid mechanisms with banking and restricted borrowing are nearly equal to the tax, and the 
safety valve mechanism has a slightly lower expected NPV of abatement costs (see Table 3 in 
the appendix for full details of values underlying Figure 5).11 This is because the price ceiling 
allows for additional banking early in the regulatory term, resulting in an emissions path closer to 
the firm-optimal path. When banking and borrowing are not allowed, the price collars have 
nearly the same expected NPV of abatement costs as their safety valve analogues, with costs 
increasing as the spread or 
c
t P  increases. This suggests that for the constant-decline path there is 
little abatement cost trade-off between the addition of a price floor and a more restrictive 
allowance issuance path when banking/borrowing is not allowed. Finally, as has been shown in 
other related studies (e.g., Cronshaw and Kruse 1996 and Rubin 1996), we see that including 
banking/borrowing, even if the borrowing is restricted, can lead to considerable discounted 
abatement cost savings compared to a quantity policy without intertemporal trading when the 
allowance issuance path varies significantly from the firm-optimal path.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Both safety valve and price collar mechanisms with a and b values other than what is shown here can meet the 
cumulative emissions target and have expected NPV of abatement costs lower than that of the tax policy. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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Figure 5: Policy Comparison—Constant-Declining Issuance Path
* 
 
*Notes: Coll. 1 refers to the collar with X = $10. Coll. 2 refers to the collar with X = $20. SV 1 and SV 2 refer to the 
policies using the same 
c
t P as the Coll. 1 and Coll. 2, respectively. Restr. B/B refers to policies with unlimited 
banking and restricted borrowing. No B/B refers to policies with no banking or borrowing. 
Finally, we evaluate the hybrid mechanisms under a combination of the scenarios 
described above. For this “mixed” case, allowances are issued on the constant-decline issuance 
path, but   and 
cf
tt PP  are designed such that they grow at the firm’s rate of interest, as they did in 
our “firm-optimal issuance path” analysis. This mixed case is not without real-world context. For 
example, as noted, the allowance issuance path given in S.1766 more closely resembles our 
constant-decline path than our ex-ante firm-optimal path, but the price ceiling provision in that 
proposed legislation grows at a rate of five percent annually.  
Figure 6 presents a graphical comparison of the hybrid mechanisms’ expected NPV of 
abatement costs and cumulative emissions outcomes for the mixed case described above 
(detailed values given in Table 4 in the appendix). Again, the collar mechanisms provide lower 
expected NPV of abatement costs than their safety valve counterparts. However, all hybrid 
mechanisms analyzed here had lower expected NPV of abatement costs than a tax policy 
designed to achieve an emissions path equal to the constant-decline allowance issuance path. The 
hybrid mechanisms also provide similar upper limits on the 95 percent confidence intervals of Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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cumulative emissions, suggesting little trade-off of the two mechanisms based on environmental 
standards. 
In comparing the results of the hybrid mechanism under the “mixed” scenario case to the 
those presented in the constant-decline issuance path scenario, we see that having the price 
mechanisms referenced to an expected emissions price that rises at the rate of interest, instead of 
being based on   0
y
t EP ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ of the constant-decline issuance path reduces expected abatement costs 
considerably. This is because when
c
t P is based on the 0
y
t E P ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ of the constant-decline issuance 
path, it is generally higher than the 
c
t P  based on the firm-optimal price path and therefore not 
useful in protecting against high abatement cost periods. In the case where 
c
t P is based on an 
expected price rising at the rate of interest, it is following the firm’s optimal price path and 
therefore more useful in reducing high-cost periods. However, this cost reduction is coupled with 
a greater variance in cumulative emissions outcome. Again this is because 
c
t P based on the ex-
ante firm-optimal price path is relevant for more subperiods in the regulatory term when it is 
rising at the rate of interest compared to when it is based on  0
y
t EP ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦. 








t P both increase over time at a rate equal to the firm’s interest rate. The permit issuance path 
declines at a constant rate gy. Coll. 1 refers to the collar with X = $10. Coll. 2 refers to the collar with X = $20. SV 1 Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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and SV 2 refer to the policies using the same 
c
t P as the Coll. 1 and Coll. 2, respectively. Restr. B/B refers to policies 
with unlimited banking and restricted borrowing. No B/B refers to policies with no banking or borrowing. 
VI. Conclusion 
As the U.S. moves forward with a cap-and-trade policy for CO2 emissions, concerns 
persist over the potential volatility of regulatory costs. Several mechanisms have been suggested 
to protect against untenably high volatility in compliance costs. In this study, we compare several 
of these mechanisms, including quantity-based policies with banking and borrowing, price 
policies, and hybrid policies (safety valve and price collar), using a dynamic model with 
stochastic baseline emissions. Unlike most other instrument comparison studies, we do not 
specify an emissions damage function; rather, we compare mechanisms under the design goal of 
obtaining the same expected cumulative emissions across all policies.  
A number of policy-relevant observations emerge from this analysis. First, it is clear that 
allowance borrowing can lower costs, significantly so when allowances are issued such that they 
decline at a constant rate—as in pending legislation—rather than on the basis of an ex-ante firm-
optimal emissions path. Restrictions on borrowing, including requirements to pay interest, can be 
quite costly. In our modeling, interest rates above six percent per annum negate virtually all the 
gains from borrowing.  
Second, the inclusion of a safety valve or a price collar (symmetric safety valve) can 
significantly reduce costs compared to pure quantity-based instruments, almost to the levels of a 
pure tax. At the same time, the safety valve and price collar both result in less cumulative 
emissions variability than a pure tax. In our simulations, we find that price collars and safety 
valves can reduce expected abatement costs by as much as 18 and 17 percent, respectively, 
relative to a cap-and-trade system with no banking and borrowing. These cost savings are 
reduced, however, if the allowance issuance path more closely resembles the firm-optimal 
emissions path and/or unlimited banking and borrowing of allowances is permitted. In terms of 
cumulative emissions, we find that the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval for 
cumulative emissions of a tax policy is 3 to 7 percent higher than that of the price collar and 
safety valve scenarios examined here. 
Third, a price collar is always more cost-effective than a safety valve for a given expected 
cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement when allowance 
prices decline. At the same time, the upper end of cumulative emissions outcomes for the two 
hybrid mechanisms is quite similar. Also, though not the focus of this study, a price collar may 
encourage greater investment in new technologies by reducing concerns about a price collapse. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
24 
Fourth, even with a constant-declining allowance issuance path, there are efficiency gains 
from having the trigger prices in either a safety valve or a price collar based on a price path that 
rises at the rate of interest, consistent with the Hotelling rule. This is because price ceilings based 
on the firm-optimal price path that rises at the rate of interest are lower during early periods than 
those based on the expected price path from the constant-decline issuance path, allowing for a 
greater build up of the bank which helps with the high abatement costs in later periods. 
Although not fully examined at this time, several other observations emerge from the 
analysis. First, although we present hybrid instruments designed to produce expected cumulative 
emissions at our pre-specified target, the cumulative emissions results are quite sensitive to the 
parameters employed in the hybrid mechanisms. That is, altering the distribution of the price 
collar about the ex-ante expected price can lead to significantly different expected emissions and 
abatement cost results. Likewise, for a given trigger price on the safety valve mechanism, both 
cumulative emissions and abatement costs are quite sensitive to the allowance issuance path. 
This suggests that uncertainty about assumed parameters in our model could result in a policy 
design wherein expected cumulative emissions deviate from the regulator’s cumulative 
emissions target. This is true for both hybrid policies and an emissions tax.  
Additionally, the price floor mechanism examined here is one in which the regulator buys 
back allowances when the floor is triggered. Operationally, this floor could also work by setting 
a reserve price in allowance auctions. In such a framework, our model would have to be 
amended to include the firm’s selection of not only the state-dependent emissions level, 
(,) tt t qBθ , but also an auction purchase quantity. Since, in an auction setting, the firm is 
essentially choosing its allocation each period, this raises another modeling issue: is the baseline 
emissions shock observed before or after the auction purchase is decided? Although we leave 
this issue for future research, the link between auction frequency and uncertainty is clear. 
Finally, we emphasize a key point underlying this entire analysis: despite the obvious 
appeal of the metric expected cumulative emissions, for comparing the performance of various 
instruments used to control a stock pollutant like CO2, this may not be a universally accepted 
measure. Depending on the findings of climate scientists, the possibility that cumulative 
emissions outcomes exceed some pre-specified target in a particular regulatory period may be 
unacceptable, despite the potentially equal probability that this measure of emissions falls below 
that target. Furthermore, information about unacceptably high cumulative emissions outcomes 
may vary over time as new information about global climate systems comes to light. Regardless 
of these potential limiting factors, the analysis clearly indicates that, in choosing among the Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
25 
mechanisms considered, policy makers face a trade-off emissions certainty in particular periods 
and abatement cost reductions. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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Appendix 
Table 2. Policy Comparison—Firm-Optimal Issuance Path
 
  Emissions (Gtons CO2) NPV costs ($ in billions)   
Policy 2.5%  Mean  97.5%  2.5%  Mean  97.5%  Details 
Price            
 Tax  166.7 187.4  209.2  464.5  464.5  464.5   
Hybrid            
Collar 1, X = $10            
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  171.3 187.4  202.2  407.9  467.8  555.2  a = 4.6, b = 5.4 
 No  Bank/Borr.  173.3 187.4  202.0  390.3  472.2  558.8  a = 5, b = 5
Collar 2, X = $20            
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  175.5 187.4  196.7  362.3  474.2  631.2  a = 9.1, b = 10.9 
 No  Bank/Borr.  178.5 187.4  196.4  343.7  487.3  644.3  a = 10, b = 10
Safety Valve 1            
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  182.7 187.4  201.2  312.6  471.1  563.4  a = 4.6, φ = 0.19
 No  Bank/Borr.  179.1 187.4  201.5  366.0  486.3  571.9  a = 5, φ = 0.12
Safety Valve 2            
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  185.4 187.4  195.7  292.3  477.0  644.1  a = 9.1, φ = 0.40
 No  Bank/Borr.  182.5 187.4  195.6  332.2  497.7  656.6  a = 10, φ = 0.35
Quantity            
 Unlmtd.  Bank/Borr. 187.4 187.4  187.4  270.9  473.5  745.3   
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  186.8 187.3  187.4  273.7  488.7  786.0   
 Bank  Only  187.4 187.4  187.4  273.5  489.3  785.6   
 No  Bank/Borr.  187.4 187.4  187.4  318.2  522.5  790.5   
Notes: 2.5% and 97.5% refer to the lower bound and upper bound, respectively, of the 95% confidence interval 
based on the simulation procedure. Banking is unrestricted for all policies with banking allowed. Quantity policies 
are cap-and-trade only policies. Abbreviations: Borr., Borrow; Restr., Restricted; Unlmtd., Unlimited. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
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Table 3. Policy Comparison—Constant-Decline Issuance Path 
 
  Emissions (Gtons CO2) NPV Costs ($ in billions)   
Policy 2.5%  Mean  97.5%  2.5%  Mean  97.5%  Details 
Price             
 Tax  166.3 187.4  209.7  510.3  510.3  510.3   
Hybrid             
Collar 1, X = $10             
 No  Bank/Borr.  173.3 187.4  202.0  423.0  518.2  615.1  a = 5, b = 5
Collar 2, X = $20             
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  175.8 187.4  195.5  383.9  512.9  705.1  a = 12, b = 8 
 No  Bank/Borr.  178.5 187.4  196.4  362.9  532.8  712.5  a = 10, b = 10
Safety Valve 1             
 No  Bank/Borr.  179.5 187.4  201.5  363.0  519.3  633.8  a = 5, φ = 0.11
Safety Valve 2             
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  185.9 187.4  193.4  297.6  510.1  739.4  a = 12, φ = 0.26
 No  Bank/Borr.  183.7 187.4  195.5  327.8  532.8  723.2  a = 10, φ = 0.31
Quantity             
 Unlmtd.Bank/Borr. 187.4 187.4  187.4  270.3  473.5  745.5   
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  186.8 187.3  187.4  291.5  537.5  882.4   
 Bank  Only  187.4 187.4  187.4  291.8  537.9  882.4   
 No  Bank/Borr.  187.4 187.4  187.4  319.2  571.9  896.6   
Notes: 2.5% and 97.5% refer to the lower bound and upper bound, respectively, of the 95% confidence interval 
based on the simulation procedure. Banking is unrestricted for all policies with banking allowed. Quantity policies 
are cap-and-trade only policies. Abbreviations: Borr., Borrow; Restr., Restricted; Unlmtd., Unlimited. Resources for the Future  Fell and Morgenstern 
31 
Table 4. Constantly-Declining Issuance Path, Firm-Optimal Price Mechanisms
 
  Emissions (Gtons CO2) NPV Costs ($ in billions)   
Policy 2.5%  Mean  97.5%  2.5%  Mean  97.5%  Details 
Hybrid             
Collar 1, X = $10             
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  170.1 187.4  205.9  416.3  469.2  513.0  a = 3.8, b = 6.2 
 No  Bank/Borr.  171.6 187.4  204.8  409.3  473.2  529.8  a = 4.9, b = 5.1
Collar 2, X = $20             
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  173.8 187.4  202.5  377.3  480.8  569.9  a = 7.8, b = 12.2 
 No  Bank/Borr.  176.0 187.4  200.8  374.5  492.3  597.9  a = 9.8, b = 10.2
Safety Valve 1             
 Bank/Restr.  Borr.  171.7 187.4  205.5  388.0  475.4  542.5  a = 3.8, φ = 0.04
 No  Bank/Borr.  174.0 187.4  204.2  381.3  482.0  559.3  a = 4.9, φ = 0.05
Safety Valve 2             
  Bank/ Restr. Borr.  180.5  187.4  201.3  341.5  487.1  606.0  a = 7.8, φ = 0.13
 No  Bank/Borr.  180.3 187.4  199.9  349.5  500.5  635.9  a = 9.8, φ = 0.13
Notes: Results based on constant-decline permit issuance path and price mechanisms rising at the firm’s rate of 
interest. 2.5% and 97.5% refer to the lower bound and upper bound, respectively, of the 95% confidence interval 
based on the simulation procedure. Banking is unrestricted for all policies with banking allowed. Quantity policies 
are cap-and-trade only policies. Abbreviations: Borr., Borrow; Restr., Restricted; Unlmtd., Unlimited. 
 